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Abstract
An increasing number of digital images are being shared
and accessed through websites, media, and social applica-
tions. Many of these images have been modified and are not
authentic. Recent advances in the use of deep convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) have facilitated the task of ana-
lyzing the veracity and authenticity of largely distributed
image datasets. We examine in this paper the problem of
identifying the camera model or type that was used to take
an image and that can be spoofed. Due to the linear nature
of CNNs and the high-dimensionality of images, neural net-
works are vulnerable to attacks with adversarial examples.
These examples are imperceptibly different from correctly
classified images but are misclassified with high confidence
by CNNs. In this paper, we describe a counter-forensic
method capable of subtly altering images to change their es-
timated camera model when they are analyzed by any CNN-
based camera model detector. Our method can use both the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) or the Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) to craft these adversarial im-
ages and does not require direct access to the CNN. Our re-
sults show that even advanced deep learning architectures
trained to analyze images and obtain camera model infor-
mation are still vulnerable to our proposed method.
1. Introduction
The recent increase in the number of digital images that
are being uploaded and shared online has given rise to
unique privacy and forensic challenges [1]. Among those
challenges, verifying the integrity and authenticity of these
widely circulated pictures is one of the most critical and
complex tasks [2, 3].
In the last few years, the digital media forensic commu-
nity has explored several techniques to evaluate the truth-
fulness of digital images and media [4, 5]. Due to its mul-
tiple applicable scenarios, research efforts have focused on
camera model identification [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Determining
the camera model used to take a picture can be very impor-
tant in criminal investigations such as copyright infringe-
ment cases or where it is required to identify the authors of
pedo-pornographic material.
Camera model identification can also be considered an
important preliminary step to reduce the set of camera in-
stances when we try to detect a unique camera instance
rather than just the make and model [8]. In addition, being
able to identify the camera model by inspecting small image
regions is a viable method to uncover manipulation opera-
tions that could have been done to the image (e.g. splicing)
[11].
Current camera model identification detectors make use
of the fact that each camera model completes a distinctive
set of tasks on each image when the device acquires the
image. Examples of these tasks include the use of differ-
ent JPEG compression schemes, application of proprietary
methods for CFA demosaicing, and “defects” in the opti-
cal image path. Due to these characteristic operations, a
singular “footprint” is embedded in each picture. This in-
formation can be utilized to identify the camera model, and
perhaps the exact camera, that has been used to capture an
image or record a video sequence.
Due to the inherent and growing complexity of the image
acquisition pipeline of modern image capturing devices, it
is a difficult challenge to adequately model the set of op-
erations that a camera has to execute to capture an image.
Successful attempts that use hand-crafted features to model
the traces left by some of these operations can be found in
[7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 10, 16, 17].
The use of deep learning techniques for image and video
classification tasks [18, 19, 20] has shown that it is also pos-
sible to learn characteristic features that model a problem
space directly from the data itself. This offers a viable path
to leverage the growing amount of available image data.
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These modern approaches are data-driven in that they learn
directly from the data rather than imposing a predetermined
analytical model.
The data-driven model has recently proved valuable for
forensics applications [21, 22, 23, 24]. Initial exploratory
solutions targeting camera model identification [25, 26, 27]
show that it is possible to use CNNs to learn discriminant
features directly from the observed known images, rather
than having to use hand-crafted features. The use of CNNs
also makes it possible to capture characteristic traces left
by non-linear and hard to model operations present in the
acquisition pipeline.
With the introduction of CNNs as detectors for camera
model identification, a new vector for counter-forensic at-
tacks is presented for a malevolent skilled individual. The
idea of counter-forensics was first introduced in [28], where
the authors presented the concept of fighting against image
forensics with a practical application, namely a method for
resampling an image without introducing pixel correlations.
An up-to-date survey of the last counter-forensics advances
can be found in [29].
Before exploring the vulnerabilities of CNN-based cam-
era model detectors, it is important to note that detectors
that rely on hand-crafted features are not immune to similar
counter-forensics attacks. As explained in [30], digital cam-
era fingerprints are vulnerable to forging. In particular, if an
attacker obtains access to images from a given camera, they
can estimate its fingerprint and “paste” it into an arbitrary
image to make it look as if the image came from the camera
with the stolen fingerprint. An early attempt to investigate
such counter-forensic methods appeared in [31].
As presented in [32], several machine learning models,
including state-of-the-art convolutional neural networks,
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This means that these
machine learning models misclassify images that are only
slightly different from correctly classified images. In many
cases, an ample collection of models with different archi-
tectures trained on different subsets of the training data mis-
classify the same adversarial example [33].
Although there are techniques such as adversarial train-
ing [32] or defensive distillation [34] that can slightly re-
duce the incidence of adversarial examples in CNN-based
detectors, defending against adversarial examples is still an
on-going challenge in the deep learning community. Ad-
versarial attacks are hard to defend against because they re-
quire machine learning models that produce correct outputs
for every possible input. The imposition of linear behav-
ior when presented with inputs similar to the training data,
though desirable, is precisely the main weakness of CNNs
[33]. Due to the massive amount of possible inputs that
a CNN can be presented with, it is remarkably simple to
find adversarial examples that look unmodified to us but are
misclassified by the network. Designing a truly adaptive de-
fense against adversarial images remains an open problem.
In this paper, we propose a counter-forensic method
to subtly change an image to induce an error in its esti-
mated camera model when analyzed by a CNN-based cam-
era model detector. We leverage the recent developments to
rapidly generate adversarial images. We test our counter-
forensic method, using two well established adversarial im-
age crafting techniques [33, 35], against an advanced deep
learning architecture [36] carefully trained on a reference
camera model dataset. Our results show that even modern
and properly trained CNNs are susceptible to simple adver-
sarial attacks. Note that our method only requires access to
the predictions of the CNN-based camera model identifica-
tion detector and does not need access to the weights of the
CNN.
2. CNN-Based Camera Model Identification
In this section, we provide a brief overview of convo-
lutional neural networks sufficient to understand the rest
of this paper and show how they can be used as camera
model detectors. For a more detailed description, please re-
fer to one of the several available tutorials in the literature
[37, 38].
Convolutional neural networks are a special type of neu-
ral networks, biologically inspired by the human visual cor-
tex system, that consist of a very high number of intercon-
nected nodes, or neurons. The architecture of a CNN is
designed to take advantage of the 2D structure of an input
image. This is achieved with local connections and tied
weights followed by some forms of pooling which results
in translation invariant features. The nodes of the network
are organized in multiple stacked layers, each performing a
simple operation on the input.
The set of operations in a CNN typically comprises con-
volution, intensity normalization, non-linear activation and
thresholding, and local pooling. By minimizing a cost func-
tion at the output of the last layer, the weights of the network
are tuned so that they are able to capture patterns in the input
data and extract distinctive features.
In a CNN, the features are learned using backpropaga-
tion [39] coupled with an optimization method such as gra-
dient descent [40] and the use of large annotated training
datasets. The shallower layers of the networks usually learn
low-level visual features such as edges, simple shapes and
color contrast, whereas deeper layers combine these fea-
tures to identify complex visual patterns. Finally, fully-
connected layers coupled with a softmax layer are com-
monly used to generate an output class label that minimizes
the cost function.
For example, in the context of image classification, the
last layer is composed of N nodes, where N is the number
of classes, that define a probability distribution over the N
visual category. The value of a given node pi, i = 1, . . . , N
belonging to the last layer represents the probability of the
input image to belong to the visual class ci.
To train a CNN model for a specific image classification
task we need to define the hyperparameters of the CNN,
which range from the sequence of operations to be per-
formed, to the number of layers or the number and shape
of the filters in convolutional layers. We must also define
a proper cost function to be minimized during the training
process. Finally, a dataset of training and test images, anno-
tated with labels according to the specific task (e.g. camera
models in our work) needs to be prepared.
Figure 1 shows an example of a CNN-based pipeline for
camera model identification similar to the one presented in
[26]. To train the CNN architecture, we use a given set of
training and validation labeled image patches coming from
N known camera models. For each color image I , asso-
ciated to a specific camera model L, K non-overlapping
patches Pk, k ∈ [1,K], of size 32× 32 pixels are randomly
extracted. Each patch Pk inherits the same label L of the
source image. As trained CNN modelM, we select the one
that provides the smallest loss on validation patches.
Figure 1. Example of a pipeline for camera model identification.
The patches extracted from each training image I (bottom) inherit
the same label L of the image. These patches are used in the CNN
training process. For each patch Pk from the image I under analy-
sis (top), a candidate label Lˆk is produced by a trained CNN model
M. The predicted label Lˆ for analyzed image I is obtained by ma-
jority voting.
When a new image I is under analysis, the camera model
used to acquire it is estimated as follows. A set ofK patches
is obtained from image I as described above. Each patch Pk
is processed by CNN model M in order to assign a label
Lˆk to each patch. The predicted model Lˆ for image I is
obtained through majority voting on Lˆk, k ∈ [1,K].
3. Proposed Method
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of our proposed
counter-forensic method. Our method consists of an adver-
sarial image generator module that can be added to a CNN-
based camera model evaluation pipeline. In Figure 2, we as-
sume a similar structure to the previously presented pipeline
Figure 2. Block diagram of our proposed method.
in Section 2. Our adversarial image generator module takes
as input the set of K patches that have been extracted from
the image I that is being analyzed. When presented with
new image patches, our module can work in two different
modes.
In the first operation mode, the adversarial image gener-
ator module does an untargeted image manipulation, that is,
it does not try to perturb the image patches to produce a spe-
cific misclassification class. Instead, we use the derivative
of the loss function of the CNN with respect to the input im-
age patches to add a perturbation to the images. The deriva-
tive is computed using backpropagation with the labels Lˆ′k,
k ∈ [1,K] that are given by the CNN detector when it first
processes the unmodified image patches. This procedure is
known as the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [33].
In the second operation mode, the adversarial image gen-
erator module does a targeted image manipulation. In this
case, we try to perturb the image patches to produce a spe-
cific misclassification class L′, different from the true real
label L that is associated with the analyzed image I and its
associated Pk patches. In this mode of operation, we ex-
ploit the forward derivative of a CNN to find an adversarial
perturbation that will force the network to misclassify the
image patch into the target class by computing the adversar-
ial saliency map. Starting with an unmodified image patch,
we perturb each feature by a constant offset . This pro-
cess is repeated iteratively until the target misclassification
is achieved. This procedure is known as the Jacobian-based
saliency map attack (JSMA) [35].
We present a detailed overview of both FGSM and
JSMA techniques as follows.
3.1. Fast Gradient Sign Method
In [33], the fast gradient sign method was introduced
for generating adversarial examples using the derivative of
the loss function of the CNN with respect to the input fea-
ture vector. Given an input feature vector (e.g. an image),
FGSM perturbs each feature in the direction of the gradient
by magnitude , where  is a parameter that determines the
perturbation size. For a network with loss J(Θ, x, y), where
Θ represents the CNN predictions for an input x and y is the
correct label of x, the adversarial example is generated as
x∗ = x+ sign(∇xJ(Θ, x, y))
With small , it is possible to generate adversarial images
that are consistently misclassified by CNNs trained using
the MNIST and CIFAR-10 image classification datasets
with a high success rate [33].
3.2. Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack
In [35], an iterative method for targeted misclassification
was proposed. By exploiting the forward derivative of a
CNN, it is possible to find an adversarial perturbation that
will force the network to misclassify into a specific target
class. For an input x and a convolutional neural network
C, the output for class j is denoted Cj(x). To achieve an
output of target class t, Ct(x) must be increased while the
probabilities Cj(x) of all other classes j 6= t decrease, until
t = arg maxj Cj(x). This is accomplished by exploiting
the adversarial saliency map, which is defined as
S(x, t)[i] =
{
0, if ∂Ct(x)∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂Cj(x)
∂xi
> 0
(∂Ct(x)∂xi )|
∑
j 6=t
∂Cj(x)
∂xi
|, otherwise
for an input feature i. Because we work with images in
this paper, in our case each input feature i corresponds to a
pixel i in the image input x. Starting with a normal sam-
ple x, we locate the pair of pixels {i, j} that maximize
S(x, t)[i] + S(x, t)[j], and perturb each pixel by a constant
offset . This process is repeated iteratively until the target
misclassification is achieved. This method can effectively
produce MNIST dataset examples that are correctly clas-
sified by human subjects but misclassified into a specific
target class by a CNN with a high confidence.
3.3. Implementation Details
To implement our counter-forensic method, we have
used the software library cleverhans [41]. The library pro-
vides standardized reference implementations of adversarial
image generation techniques and adversarial training. The
library can be used to develop more robust CNN architec-
tures and to provide standardized benchmarks of CNNs per-
formance in an adversarial setting. As noted in [41], bench-
marks constructed without a standardized implementation
of adversarial image generation techniques are not compa-
rable to each other, because a good result may indicate a
robust CNN or it may merely indicate a weak implementa-
tion of the adversarial image generation procedure.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate our proposed method and
compare the results of the two techniques for generating the
adversarial images. First, we create a reference dataset spe-
cially designed to exploit the traces left by the operations
of the acquisition pipeline of different image capturing de-
vices. Then, we train an advanced deep learning architec-
ture to have a baseline to compare the accuracy results in the
presence of adversarial images. Finally, we generate several
adversarial image examples to demonstrate the performance
of our proposed method.
4.1. Experimental Setup
As part of DARPA’s MediFor Program, PAR Govern-
ment Systems collected an initial dataset of 1611 images ac-
quired by 10 different camera models, ranging from DSLRs
to phone cameras, with a mixture of indoor and outdoor flat-
field scenes. We focus on a flat-field image dataset because
flat-field images are more difficult to modify without insert-
ing visual distortions due to the absence of texture content.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to this dataset
as PRNU-PAR. Using the PRNU-PAR dataset, we create a
patch dataset, composed by image patches of 32 × 32 pix-
els randomly extracted from the original images. Specifi-
cally, 500 patches are uniformly sampled from each original
image in the PRNU-PAR dataset, which results in a patch
dataset that contains 805,500 patches in total. The train-
ing, validation and test sets are created following a 70/20/10
split, while we ensure that the patches in each dataset split
only contain patches from different images.
Table 1 shows the statistics of the patch dataset. As can
be seen, due to the difference in the number of images per
camera model class in the PRNU-PAR dataset, our dataset
of image patches has an unequal number of patches for each
of the camera models.
Camera Model Training Validation Test
AS-One 90000 25500 12500
ES-D5100 37500 10500 5000
MK-Powershot 35000 10000 5000
MK-s860 35500 10000 5000
PAR-1233 71000 20000 10000
PAR-1476 107000 30500 15000
PAR-1477 70000 20000 9500
PAR-A015 40500 11500 5500
PAR-A075 26000 7000 3500
PAR-A106 54000 15500 7500
Table 1. Number of image patches per camera class for each of the
different dataset splits.
Figure 3 shows a representative example of the images
that are present in the PRNU-PAR dataset next to one of
their randomly extracted patches. In this case, both cam-
era models PAR-A075 and PAR-A106 have been used to
capture images of a cloudy sky. Other camera models such
AS-One or ES-D5100 have taken images of a white screen.
All the image scenes that are captured in the PRNU-PAR
dataset are mostly flat and bright.
As it has been shown in the literature [7], these largely
uniform images are ideal candidates to be used for the ex-
traction of the “fingerprint” (e.g. the characteristic PRNU
noise of the camera model) left in the image by the camera.
Figure 3. Example of images from the training set of the patch
dataset. (Top) Image from camera model PAR-A075 and one of
the randomly selected patches associated with it. (Bottom) Image
from camera model PAR-A106 and one of the randomly selected
patches associated with it.
4.2. CNN Architecture
In order to do a fair evaluation of our counter-forensic
method, we use a CNN-based camera model detector that
has been trained to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy results
in the patch dataset.
CNN architecture designs have tended to explore deeper
models. Networks which can be hundreds of layers deep
are now commonplace in the literature. This design trend
has been motivated by the fact that for many applications
such as image classification tasks, an increase in the depth
of the CNN architecture translates into higher accuracy per-
formance if sufficient amounts of training data are available.
A first approach to design a CNN architecture may be
to simply stack convolutional or fully-connected layers to-
gether. This naive strategy works initially, but gains in ac-
curacy performance quickly diminish the deeper this kind
of architecture becomes. This phenomenon is due to the
way in which conventional CNNs are trained through back-
propogation. During the training phase of a CNN, gradi-
ent information must be propagated backwards through the
network. This gradient information slightly diminishes as it
passes through each layer of the neural network. For a CNN
with a reduced number of layers, this is not a problem. For
an architecture with a large number of layers, the gradient
signal essentially becomes noise by the time it reaches the
first layer of the network again.
The problem is to design a CNN in which the gradient
information can be easily distributed to all the layers with-
out degradation. ResNets and DenseNets are modern CNN
architectures that try to address this problem.
A Residual Network [42], or ResNet is a deep CNN
which tackles the problem of the vanishing gradient using
a straightforward approach. It adds a direct connection at
each layer of the CNN. In previous CNN models, the gra-
dient always has to go through the activations of the layers,
which modify the gradient information due to the nonlinear
activation functions that are commonly used. With this di-
rect connection, the gradient could theoretically skip over
all the intermediate layers and be propagated through the
network without being disturbed.
A Dense Network [36], or DenseNet generalizes the idea
of a direct connection between layers. Instead of only
adding a connection from the previous layer to the next, it
connects every layer to every other layer. For each layer,
the feature maps of all preceding layers are treated as sep-
arate inputs whereas its own feature maps are passed on as
inputs to all subsequent layers. The increased number of
connections ensures that there is always a direct route for
the information backwards through the network. The con-
nectivity pattern of DenseNets yields state-of-the-art accu-
racies on the CIFAR10 image classification dataset, which
is composed by images of 32 × 32 pixels in size.
Motivated by the accuracy performance of DenseNet in
the CIFAR10 dataset and the fact that we also work with im-
age patches of 32 × 32 pixels, we select a DenseNet model
with 40 layers as our CNN camera model detector. To pre-
vent the network from growing too wide and to improve the
parameter efficiency, we limit the growth rate of the net-
work, this is, the maximum number of input feature-maps
that each layer can produce, to k = 12. To train the CNN,
we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001
and a batch size of 512 images. After 5 training epochs, we
reach a plateau in the accuracy in our validation set. Table 2
shows the single patch accuracy results for our training, val-
idation and test splits of the patch dataset.
Dataset Split Train Validation Test
Accuracy (%) 99.8 98.7 97.7
Table 2. Single patch accuracy results for our training, validation
and test splits of the patch dataset.
4.3. Adversarial Image Generation
In order to evaluate the performance of our counter-
forensic method, we test the DenseNet model trained on the
patch dataset using untargeted attacks with FGSM and tar-
geted attacks with JSMA. To properly evaluate our method,
we only perturb images from the test split which were cor-
rectly classified by our CNN in their original states.
To be clear, what we refer as the average confidence
score in this paper is the average value of the probability
that is associated with the candidate camera model label for
each of the image patches in the test split. The probability
Figure 4. An example of untargeted fast adversarial image generation using FGSM applied to our trained DenseNet model on the patch
dataset. By adding an imperceptibly small vector whose elements are equal to the sign of the elements of the gradient of the cost function
with respect to the input, we can change DenseNet’s classification of the image patch.
for each candidate camera model label corresponds with the
highest probability value assigned by the softmax layer of
our trained DenseNet model.
For untargeted attacks with FGSM, we report in Table
3 the error rate and the average confidence score on the test
split of the patch dataset for different values of which have
been shown to generate high misclassified adversarial im-
ages while not producing appreciable visual changes. We
find that using  = 0.005 offers the best compromise be-
tween error rate and visual changes in the image, causing
the trained DenseNet model detector to have a error rate of
93.1% with an average confidence of 95.3% on the patch
test split. It should be noted that as we increase the value of
, the manipulations become more visually apparent.
Figure 4 shows an example of the adversarial images that
our proposed method can generate when we use FGSM. The
modifications done to the images by FGSM are performed
on 32-bit floating point values, which are used for the input
of the DenseNet model. The gradient computed for Figure
4 uses 8-bit signed integers. To publish the sign of the gra-
dient image in the paper, we have done a custom conversion
from 8-bit signed integers to 8-bit unsigned integers. To
increase the range of each color channel, we represent the
−1s values as 0 and the 1s as 255. For the possible 0’s, we
have treated them as positive values (they are represented
by 255).
For targeted attacks with JSMA, we report in Table 4 the
error rate and the average confidence score for each possi-
ble camera model target class. Figure 5 shows an example
of the images that JSMA allows us to generate when we per-
form a targeted attack. In this case, an image patch captured
by camera ES-D5100 that is correctly classified when is an-
alyzed by our trained DenseNet model is manipulated to be
misclassified as an image patch that had been generated by

value
Error
rate (%)
Confidence
Score (%)
0.001 91.4 97.7
0.002 91.7 97.2
0.003 92.2 96.7
0.004 92.7 95.8
0.005 93.1 95.3
0.006 94.1 95.1
0.007 94.5 94.2
0.008 95.3 93.6
0.009 95.9 93.0
0.01 96.2 92.3
Table 3. Error rate and confidence score values of our trained
DenseNet model after an untargeted attack with FGSM to the test
split with different values of .
Target
Camera Model
Error
rate (%)
Confidence
Score (%)
AS-One 99.5 87.7
ES-D5100 99.3 88.6
MK-Powershot 99.3 88.4
MK-s860 99.7 88.5
PAR-1233 99.7 87.9
PAR-1476 99.4 88.1
PAR-1477 99.5 88.2
PAR-A015 99.6 88.4
PAR-A075 99.3 87.8
PAR-A106 99.2 87.9
Table 4. Error rates and confidence scores of our trained DenseNet
model for each possible target camera model after applying a tar-
geted attack with JSMA to the test split.
camera model PAR-1233. It is important to appreciate that
although JSMA allows us to generate image patches that
get misclassified into a specific camera model with high er-
ror rates and confidence scores, the modifications that it ap-
plies to the images can usually be spotted through visual
inspection. This effect is due to the fact that JSMA crafts
the adversarial images by flipping pixels to their minimum
or maximum values. Because our patch dataset is composed
of image patches with mostly flat scene content, the effect
can be clearly observed, for example, in the upper corners
of the manipulated image patch in Figure 5.
Figure 5. An example of targeted adversarial image generation us-
ing JSMA applied to our trained DenseNet model on the patch
dataset. (Left) Original image patch correctly classified as ES-
D5100. (Right) Altered image patch with target camera model
PAR-1233
5. Conclusions
This paper described a counter-forensic method to subtly
alter images to change their estimated camera model when
they are analyzed by a CNN-based camera model detector.
We tested our method on a reference dataset with images
from multiple cameras that show highly similar indoor and
outdoor scenes. The results demonstrate that we can gen-
erate imperceptibly altered adversarial images that are mis-
classified with high confidence by the CNN. In the future,
we will extend our method to apply it to video sequences
and we will explore viable adversarial example detection
methods and defense techniques to increase the robustness
of CNN-based camera model detectors.
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